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Victor v. Nebraska: 
DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE DOES 
NOT REQUIRE 
THAT JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS 
EMPLOY ANY 
PARTICULAR 
FORMULATION OF 
''REASONABLE 
DOUBT," 
BUT MERELY 
REQUIRE S THAT 
THE CONCEPT BE 
ACCURATELY 
CONVEYED. 
In Victor v. Nebraska, 
114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994), the 
United States Supreme Court 
reaffirmed its reluctance to su-
pervise the use of state model 
jury instructions to define the 
"reasonable doubt" standard to 
juries in criminal trials. In so 
doing, the Court sent a clear 
message that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not require 
states to perfectly define the 
gray area at which "reasonable 
doubt" resides. 
On October 14, 1984, 
AUrredPurthurSandovrushotand 
killed two men in a gang-related 
incident in California. Two 
weeks later, he killed aman who 
had given the police informa-
tion about the earlier killings 
and that man's wife. The jury in 
his case was given the following 
instruction on reasonable doubt: 
'''Reasonable doubt' .. 
.is that state of the case which, 
after ... consideration of all the 
evidence, leaves the mind ofthe 
jurors in that condition that they 
cannot say that they feel an abid-
ing conviction, to a moral cer-
tainty, of the truth ofthe charge." 
Sandoval was convicted 
of four counts of first-degree 
murder with special circum-
stances. He was sentenced to 
death for murdering the woman 
and was sentenced to life in 
prison without the possibility of 
parole for the other three mur-
ders. 
Similarly, on December 
26, 1987, Clarence Victor killed 
an elderly acquaintance by beat-
ing her with a pipe and slashing 
her throat. The jury in his case 
was given the following instruc-
tion on the definition of reason-
able doubt: 
"'Reasonable doubt' is 
such doubt as would cause a 
reasonable person ... to pause 
and hesitate before taking the 
represented facts as true and 
relying and acting thereon. You 
may be convinced of the truth of 
a fact beyond a reasonable doubt 
and yet be fully aware that pos-
sibly you may be mistaken. A 
reasonable doubt is an actual 
and substantial doubt arising 
from the evidence, from the facts 
or circumstances ... and [is] 
distinguished from a doubt aris-
ing from mere possibility, bare 
imagination or fanciful conjec-
ture." 
Victor was convicted of 
first degree murder and was sen-
tenced to death. On appeal, 
both Sandoval's and Victor's 
convictions were affirmed by 
the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia and the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska, respectively. The 
United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in each case. 
Because ofthe similarity offacts 
and issues existing between the 
two cases, they were consoli-
dated and decided together on 
appeal. 
The Court began its 
analysis by reaffirming the prin-
ciple that, in criminru trials, due 
process requires that the gov-
ernment prove each and every 
element of a charged offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 
at 1242 (citing In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358 (1970)). How-
ever, the Court acknowledged 
that, although a bedrock prin-
ciple of the American justice 
system, the concept of reason-
able doubt "defies easy explica-
tion." Id The Court rejected 
the notion that the Constitution 
requires the use of any particu-
lar phraseology when advising a 
jury of the government's bur-
den of proof and concluded that 
the instructions need only cor-
rectly convey the concept of 
"reasonable doubt" to survive 
constitutional scrutiny. Id at 
1251 (citing Holland v. United 
States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 
(1954». The Court firmly re-
jected any notion that it should 
perform a supervisory role over 
state courts' reasonable doubt 
instructions by indicating that 
the proper inquiry when review-
ing a challenged jury instruction 
is whether there was a reason-
able likelihood that the jury ap-
plied the instruction in an un-
constitutional manner. Id 
The Court then noted 
that Sandoval's primary objec-
tions to the jury instructions 
given in his case concerned the 
use of nineteenth century 
phrases such as "to a moral 
certainty" and "moral evi-
dence." These phrases, he con-
tended, confused the jury by 
pointing its attention to the eth-
ics and morality of his criminal 
actions rather than toward the 
facts and evidence presented in 
the case, thereby rendering the 
instruction unconstitutional. 
The Court acknowledged that 
neither "moral certainty" nor 
"moral evidence" were main-
stays of modern vocabulary, and 
expressed particular concern 
over the use of the former. Id at 
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1247. The Court accepted the 
premise that either of these 
phrases, standing alone, might 
not be synonymous with the 
correct standard of "reasonable 
doubt," which the jury might 
then understand to mean proof 
lower than the "very high level 
of probability required by the 
Constitution in criminal cases." 
Id 
Nevertheless, the Court 
rejected this argument, pointing 
out that in Sandoval's case, the 
challenged phrases did not stand 
alone; but rather, they were de-
fined within the instructions. Id 
at 1246-47. The Court reasoned 
that the statement that "abso-
lute certainty was unattainable 
in matters relating to human 
affairs" focused the jurors' at-
tention on the evidence and proof 
introduced at trial, and not upon 
their own personal notions of 
morality and justice, for the de-
termination of guilt or inno-
cence.ld at 1247-48. There-
fore, the Court concluded that 
the instruction, taken as a whole, 
was "unproblematic" and did 
not offend due process. Id at 
1247. 
The Court then turned 
its attention to Petitioner 
Victor's case, and his conten-
tion that his jury instruction 
impermissibly equated "reason-
able doubt" with "substantial 
doubt," thereby overstating the 
degree of doubt necessary for 
an acquittal by the jury. Id at 
1250. The Court agreed that 
this equation was "somewhat 
problematic" because it could 
indeed imply to the j ury that for 
acquittal it must have a large 
degree of doubt about the truth 
of the charge, a standard clearly 
greater than required under 
Winship. Id The Court noted 
that for precisely this reason, 
several courts, including itself, 
had criticized the use of "sub-
stantial doubt" to define a rea-
sonable doubt. Id (citing Tay-
lor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 
488 (1978». 
However, despite these 
concerns, the Court pointed out 
that, as in Sandoval's case, the 
instruction in Victor's case pro-
vided a frame of reference for 
"substantial doubt," giving it 
context and informing the jury 
of its intended meaning. Id The 
Court opined that the explicit 
distinction between "substan-
tial doubt" and "fanciful con-
jecture" saved the instruction 
from unconstitutionality by mak-
ing it clear to the jury that "sub-
stantial" referred to the exist-
ence of some doubt, rather than 
the magnitude of doubt, required 
for acquittal. Id 
In addition, the Court 
reasoned that the instruction did 
not offend due process, not-
withstanding the use of "sub-
stantial doubt," because it also 
included an appropriate alter-
native definition of "reason-
able doubt": that degree of 
doubt that would cause a rea-
sonable person to hesitate to 
act. Id The Court reaffirmed 
its approval of this formulation, 
holding that it was a sufficiently 
c1earcommon-sense benchmark 
of the degree of doubt neces-
sary for acquittal. Id (citing 
Holland, 348 U.S. at 140). 
Finally, the Court re-
jected Victor's argument that 
the instruction's reference to 
"strong possibilities" under-
stated the government's burden 
of proof. The Court once again 
pointed out that the instruction 
clearly informed the jury that 
the possibilities must be suffi-
ciently strong based upon the 
evidence and facts presented to 
prove the defendant's guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt; there-
fore, the instruction was consti-
tutional. Id. at 1251 (citing 
Dunbar v. United States, 156 
U.S. 185, 199 (1895)). 
In a concurring opinion, 
Justice Kennedy expressed con-
cern over the use of archaic 
terms and phrases in modern 
jury instructions, notingthatthey 
tend to "confuse far more than 
they clarify." Id. He criticized 
their continued use as "quite 
indefensible" when asking ju-
rors to perform the difficult task 
of deciding guilt orinnocence in 
a criminal trial. Id. Neverthe-
less, he agreed with the 
majority'sholdingthatthechal-
lenged instructions were not of-
fensive to due process. Id. 
Justice Ginsburg, in a 
dissenting opinion, took issue 
with the conclusion that "rea-
sonable doubt" is practically 
undefinable and thattrial courts 
should not attempt to define the 
concept unless asked to do so 
by the jury. Id. at 1252-53. Al-
though she agreed that the in-
structions in these particular 
cases did not offend due pro-
cess, she voiced her disapproval 
of the continued use of terms 
attempting to define "reason-
able doubt" that were 
"unhelpful at best and utterly 
confusing at worst," and she 
encouraged the Court's en-
dorsement ofthe model reason-
able doubt instruction proposed 
by the Federal Judicial Center, 
which does not contain any an-
tiquated language. Id. at 1253. 
In a strongly-worded 
dissent, Justice Blackmun, 
joined in part by Justice Souter, 
argued that the reasonable doubt 
standard could only protect in-
nocent defendants to the extent 
that it was understood by juries. 
In his view, it was "critical that 
the moral force of the criminal 
law not be diluted by a standard 
of proof that leaves people in 
doubt whether innocent [per-
sons] are being condemned." 
. Id. at 1254 (quoting Winship, 
397 U.S. at 364)). He con-
demned the majority's willing-
ness to overlook the "predomi-
nance of potentially misleading 
language" in Victor's instruc-
tion, the whole purpose of 
which, in his view, was to 
"minimize the jury's sense of 
responsibility for the conviction 
of those who may be innocent." 
Id. at 1257. 
In Victor v. NebraSka, 
the United States Supreme 
Court clearly indicated that it 
will not lead the charge to re-
write and clarify state reason-
able doubt instructions anytime 
in the near future. The Court 
foreclosed the use of the Due 
Process Clause to force states 
to redraft these instructions. 
Nevertheless, the push for revi-
sion of instructions concerning 
this central standard in criminal 
trials will no doubt continue and 
perhaps even gain momentum, 
given the justices' finding that 
current instructions are "ar-
chaic," "problematic," and 
"quite indefensible." 
- William L. Mitchell, II 
